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   Underground economic activity plays a significant role in organized 
crime. This is especially the case with cigarette smuggling , a world-wide 
phenomenon in the 1990s. First, it provides a low-risk source of income. In 
Italy, for example, contraband cigarettes are estimated to be a $1 billion-a-
year enterprise for organized crime. Second, it facilitates the establishment 
of criminal infrastructures that can be used to handle other illegal com-
modities. Again, to take an example from Italy, there's evidence that , when 
Sicilian organized crime figures entered heroin trafficking in the 1970s , 
they used the same smuggling routes and techniques they had pioneered in 
the 1950s and '60s to handle black market cigarettes. And third, it provides 
groups of criminals with the capital and opportunities to establish a more 
extensive and organized criminal infrastructure. An example: Croups of 
criminals based On Some Indian reservations on the Canada-U .S. border 
have become powerful and well organized as a result of their Participation 
in the bootlegging of cigarettes. They now handle narcotics and illegal fire-
arms. Law enforcement traditionally neglects to examine the role of under-
ground economic activity in combating organized crime. But focusing on 
this area can generate useful opportunities to attack criminal enterprises in 
areas where they may be at their most vulnerable. 
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BIack markets promote the development of organized crime groups . 
Once established, these groups are difficult to eliminate . Even if the poli-
cies which initially spawned a particular black market are repealed
, case 
studies have shown that criminal groups will simply shift to another illegal 
sector. 
   In the United States, for example , a number of organized crime groups 
came to the fore in the 1920s and early '30s during Prohibition . In circum-
venting the ban on alcohol, these groups grew wealthy and powerful . When 
Prohibition was repealed, their criminal infrastructure was so firmly estab -
lished that they simply moved to profit from other illegal commodities . 
   Canada suffered a similar fate during its contraband crisis in the 1990s 
when excessively high taxes spawned a smuggling boom . When taxes were 
lowered in early 1994, cigarette smuggling slowed to a trickle . But the crimi-
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nal groups who had profited from the contraband tobacco trade did not dis-
appear. They simply shifted to other illicit products, including untaxed al-
cohol, narcotics and banned firearms. 
   Focusing on the contraband tobacco trade, this report will: 
• Draw on international case studies to show how black markets promote 
the growth and development of organized crime groups; 
• Outline the types of policies which facilitate the emergence of underground 
economic sectors; 
• Describe the impact of underground sectors on the legitimate distribution 
and retail sectors; 
• Show how black markets have a corrupting influence on individual citi-
zens and create additional opportunities for public sector corruption; and 
• Demonstrate techniques and procedures for taking effective law enforce-
ment action against contraband sectors. 
                  2. Contraband Tobacco: 
                   A General Introduction
  2.1 The Nature of the Contraband Tobacco Trade 
   High tobacco taxes create a consumer demand for a cheaper product. 
Organized criminals take advantage of this Situation by establishing net-
works to smuggle, distribute and retail untaxed cigarettes. Their profit mar-
gin is the price difference between taxed and untaxed cigarettes. The higher 
the taxes, the greater the profit margin to organized crime. 
   Cigarette smuggling damages society in numerous ways, many of which 
are unforeseen. Illegal cigarettes allow organized crime to undermine the 
legal distribution and retailing networks by competing unfairly in the mar-
ket place. This penalizes honest retailers and wholesalers who dutifully re-
mit taxes. As a result, they can't compete with vendors who sell cheaper, 
black market cigarettes. Some are driven out of business. Others are forced, 
out of economic necessity, to participate in an illegal activity. 
    The evasion of tobacco taxes reduces government revenues, which, in 
turn, means government programs and services are either cut, reduced or 
taxes are raised. Moreover, an increase in cigarette taxes can also spur a 
variety of criminal activities, which put an additional burden on law en-
forcement and tax compliance resources. Perhaps the most pernicious ef-
fect of underground economic activity is that it brings otherwise law-abid-
ing citizens into contact with criminal activity. In our experience, most people 
who consume contraband tobacco don't think they're doing anything wrong,
CHAPTER 13 CONTRABAND TOBACCO AND ORGANIZED CRIME  241
even though they're breaking the law . Rather, because they may feel un-
fairly taxed, they may justify what they're doing as a form of civil disobedi-
ence, a popular tax revolt. What they rarely understand is that their actions 
undermine the moral fiber of their community by promoting law breaking 
and disrespect for the law. Mr. Peter Spiro, a Canadian expert on under-
ground economic activity stated that any increase in the underground 
economy represents a decline in respect for legal modes of behavior and a 
weakening of the social contract.
3. Organized Crime and the Contraband 
 Tobacco Sector
   3.1 Overview 
   Cigarette smuggling is a huge money-maker for organized criminals 
around the world. Smuggled cigarettes are the perfect product for the crimi-
nal underworld for the following reasons: 
• They are a relatively low-risk source of cash; 
• They provide an entry point for organized crime into legitimate business 
sectors, at both the retail and wholesale level; 
• Like alcohol during Prohibition in the United States
, contraband ciga-
rettes permit lower-echelon criminals to establish , finance and consolidate 
a sophisticated illicit infrastructure; and 
• They promote the establishment or enhancement of sophisticated smug -
gling and distribution systems. These systems are often difficult to detect 
and can be used to smuggle other illegal goods .
   3.2 Types of Organized Criminal Activity 
   In general, some tobacco smugglers operate in a number of far-flung 
geographic areas; others stick to local. markets. In many cases, they may 
also handle drugs and alcohol. Cigarettes are sometimes exchanged for other 
illegal products, including narcotics. Because cigarette smuggling is a ma-
jor world-wide problem, illicit supplies can be obtained from a wide range 
of international sources. Popular American brands, for example , are manu-
factured around the world, from Eastern Europe to Southeast Asia .
  3.3 Billions of "Missing" Cigarettes 
   What makes international smuggling possible is a ready supply of 
"homeless" cigarettes
. Every year, tens of billions of cigarettes literally 
"disappear" off th
e world's international trade balance sheets. This is an
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unusual development for such a high-value commodity that is a key rev-
enue generator for Governments around the globe. In 1985, 17.8 billion 
packs of cigarettes were exported around the world, according to U.S. De-
partment of Agriculture ("USDA") figures. But records also show that only 
15.7 billion packs were recorded as actually being imported - a difference 
of 2.1 billion packs. In 1992, USDA preliminary data indicated a gap of 8.5 
billion packs. These unaccounted exported cigarettes conceal the billions 
of cigarettes that fill the international demand for untaxed cigarettes. Gaps 
between export and import figures can also be an indication of smuggling 
activity between two countries. Canada, for example, recorded huge levels 
of exports to the United States in the early 1990s, coinciding with a surge in 
contraband activity. These cigarettes were primarily Canadian brands for 
which there is only a small international market. The bulk of these ciga-
rettes ended up in the hands of criminal groups which smuggled them back 
into Canada.
4. Intrtnational Case Studies
  4.1 Italy and the Mafia 
   Contraband cigarettes are believed to generate $1 billion in profits for 
organized crime in Italy. It is estimated that the illicit cigarette sector em-
ploys nearly 509,000 at the retail level and 25,000 at the smuggling/distri-
bution level. The illegal cigarette trade is especially important in the Italian 
city of Naples, where according to the Reuters news agency, some 8,000 
families live from the annual $600 million contraband cigarette trade con-
trolled by the Camorra, the local Mafia. Historically, tobacco smuggling 
gave important elements of the Mafia in Italy the opportunity to establish a 
sophisticated criminal infrastructure. In particular, there was a symbiosis 
between the routes/systems used to smuggle cigarettes and those that handle 
morphine base and heroin, as well as illegal arms. 
   Contraband tobacco moves through an elaborate network. It begins in 
Switzerland, Belgium, and Holland, which are manufacturing states. From 
there, the cigarettes are moved to storage depots in Hungary, Romania, 
Bulgaria, and Turkey. The former Yugoslavia and Albania are the staging 
areas for the final run into the Adriatic into Italy. According to author Claire 
Sterling in Thieves World, She stated: 
"..... This circuit in reverse constitutes the famous Balkan route . The 
biggest two-way trade in arms and drugs ever uncovered has depended on it 
since the 1960s. Three-quarters of the heroin reaching Western Europe and
CHAPTER 13 CONTRABAND TOBACCO AND ORGANIZED CRIME 243
a substantial portion of America's travels along it ..." 
   Or consider the case of Tomaso Buscetta, a major Italian Mafia heroin 
trafficker in the 1970s who became a high-profile , protected government 
witness a decade later. Buscetta was heavily involved in the contraband 
tobacco trade, starting in the late  1950s, when Italian authorities caught him 
red-handed with a shipment of nearly four tons of contraband cigarettes . As 
investigative reporter Sterling stated in her book Octopus: 
   "The [contraband cigarettes] had come from Tangiers, a conveniently 
situated free port on the north African coast facing Gibraltar , favored by 
spies, smugglers, money changers, fugitive crooks, and other assorted vil-
lains. This was the seat of a Corsican buccaneer named Paolo Molinelli 
whose private fleet plied the Mediterranean with contraband tobacco for all 
of Europe.. his fleet [also] carried morphine base from Lebanon to Marseilles , 
and refined heroin from Marseilles to Sicily for forwarding to Cosa Nostra 
in America. This was where the international heroin network got its start , 
and where master traffickers like Buscetta got theirs ." 
   Added journalist Ralph Blumenthal in Last Days Of The Sicilians: 
   "Initially
, loads of five hundred cases of cigarettes were considered 
substantial; at its height the racket dealt in shiploads of up to forty thousand 
cases, providing a livelihood for thousands of otherwise unemployable Si-
cilian poor. Mafiosi and their allies in the Neapolitan Camorra masterminded 
the traffic."
4.2 The Colombian Cartels 
   This model also applies to Colombia with respect to the birth of the 
cocaine industry in the mid-1970s, although cigarettes were just one of the 
many products being smuggled. Cocaine trafficking became established 
when experienced groups of smugglers - who had learned their trade by 
handling cigarettes, among other contraband products - shifted to handling 
this more lucrative commodity. As Guy Gugliotta and Jeff Leen noted in 
their book King of Cocaine: 
   "Perfectly respectable men - and some not so respectable - made a 
living smuggling liquor and cigarettes by ship from the United States . This 
was where Colombia's cocaine industry took root." 
   There are indications that some Colombian cocaine barons still handle 
cigarettes, but for a different purpose. It is believed that, in some cases , they 
patriate cocaine profits earned in the United States through cigarette pur-
chases. These cigarettes are imported into Colombia and sold there, provid-
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ing cocaine traffickers with a seemingly legal alibi for the source of their 
wealth.
  4.3 Lessons from Italy and Colombia 
   In both Italy and Colombia, once a smuggling organization was en-
trenched, it had the organizational and financial resources to participate in a 
variety of other criminal activities. In the process, it became extremely dif-
ficult to destroy. Another example occurred during Prohibition, when the 
organized criminals who dominated the American underworld into the 1940s, 
1950s and 1960s began by running bootleg alcohol. That experience al-
lowed them to gain the expertise, the manpower and sufficient capital to 
maintain a large-scale criminal infrastructure.
  4.4 Hong Kong 
   Police in Hong Kong report that up to 40 percent of all cigarettes smoked 
in the British colony are contraband. According to Don Watson, the Com-
missioner of Customs, the impetus appears to be a 100 percent increase in 
the tobacco tax in 1991. As he told the South China Morning Post: "This 
inevitably led to a lucrative trade in smuggling [tax free] cigarettes into 
Hong Kong for sale on the black market."
  4.5 Asia 
   In 1994, China launched "a nation-wide crusade" against the produc-
tion and marketing of contraband cigarettes. Elsewhere in Asia, media re-
ports indicate that cigarette smuggling is a problem in Indonesia, Taiwan 
and Vietnam.
   4.6 Europe 
   In Spain, the contraband market has a street value of about $1 billion, 
according to a report in the Financial Times of London. In 1993, German 
customs officials seized 624 million cigarettes smuggled from Eastern Eu-
rope - more than twice the number in 1992, according to the news agency, 
Agence France Presse. It should be noted that customs officers typically 
confiscate only a small percentage of illegal shipments. In Eastern Europe, 
according to media reports, contraband cigarettes are a serious problem in 
Poland, where 50 to 80 percent of imported cigarettes are smuggled, as well 
as in the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Romania.
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                5. Canada: A Case Study 
   5.1 Introduction 
   High tobacco taxes in Canada fueled the explosive growth of an orga-
nized crim-dominated black market in the early 1990s. At its height in 1993, 
it was estimated that nearly one in three cigarettes consumed in Canada was 
contraband.
   5.2 Size of the Contraband Market 
   In 1985, there was virtually no contraband tobacco for sale in Canada . 
By 1993 - as the result of continuous tax increases that shot up the price of 
a package to more than US$4.25 in many parts of the country - Lindquist 
Avey estimated the tobacco black market at more than 770 million pack-
ages of cigarettes (20 to a pack). That was approximately 30% of the total 
number of packages purchased in Canada. Tobacco smuggling was particu-
larly out of control in the province of Quebec. Law enforcement officials 
estimated in 1993 that up to two-thirds of the cigarettes smoked in the prov-
ince were purchased illegally.
   5.3 Lost Tax Revenue 
   The cost to the federal and provincial governments (especially Ontario 
and Quebec) was staggering. In 1993, the tax revenue lost to the federal 
government was approximately US$1 billion.
   5.4 Massive Tax Cuts 
   Faced with an unofficial tax revolt and a growing lawlessness, the fed-
eral government made massive tax cuts on cigarettes in February 1994. 
"Smuggling is threatening the safety of our communities and the livelihood 
of law-abiding merchants," said the Canadian Prime Minister, Jean Chretien, 
as he announced the reductions. "It is a threat to the very fabric of Canadian 
society." His words were echoed by the Solicitor General of Canada, Herb 
Gray. "Organized crime has become a major player in the contraband mar-
ket," he  said. "What we are facing is a frightening growth in criminal activ-
ity. We are seeing a breakdown in respect for Canadian law. Canadian soci-
ety is the victim."
5.5 High Taxes in Canada Created a Gangster Economy 
"There are strong parallels between the cigarette sm
uggling trade and
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the days of Prohibition," a Canadian newspaper concluded. "[You might as 
well] put a fedora on the head of today's cigarette smuggler and give him a 
nickname like Machine-gun Kelly." The Prohibition analogy was cited fre-
quently in Canada during the past few years to describe the popular revolt 
against high taxes on cigarettes - and the extensive criminal underworld 
that exploited the eagerness of many smokers to flout the law. In an ironic 
twist, instead of alcohol being smuggled into the United States from Canada, 
as happened during Prohibition, cigarettes were smuggled into Canada from 
south of the border. Just as many U.S. citizens in the 1920s and early 1930s 
rebelled against the 18th Amendment - which banned alcohol - many Cana-
dian smokers considered the high cigarette prices unjust and unfair. And 
just as Prohibition gave birth to organized criminal gangs that continued to 
flourish long after temperance was repealed, so too has tobacco smuggling 
in Canada introduced new criminal players into Canadian society.
   5.6 Organized Crime in Canada 
   Organized crime's involvement in the contraband tobacco trade in 
Canada took two forms: 
• traditional crime groups saw it as another profitable illicit enterprise; and 
• non-traditional groups, including some based on native Indian reserves, 
built up expertise and a criminal infrastructure as a result of their experi-
ence in the cigarette business. 
   As Prime Minister Chretien warned Canadians in February 1994: 
"When you are buying contraband cartons of cigarettes , you aren't just sav-
ing a few dollars for yourself, you are directly supporting organized crime."
  5.7 A Money-Maker for Organized Crime Groups 
   Contraband cigarettes became a valuable commodity to organized crime 
groups. In some cases criminals exchanged them instead of money for ille-
gal drugs. According to a report by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
("the RCMP"), Canada's national police force: 
   "RCMP in Edmonton concluded a major investigation in June 1991 
   involving cocaine trafficking by criminal elements within the Edmonton 
   Vietnamese community. The medium of exchange, however, was ciga-
   rettes rather than money - a 'flashroll' consisting of [CDN] $200,000 
   worth of cigarettes was exchanged for 1.1 kilograms of cocaine. 
   In some cases, traditional organized crime groups purchased duty-free 
cigarettes from American wholesalers and looked after the smuggling op-
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eration themselves. A popular method involved hiding contraband products 
in shipments of legitimate products such as fruits and vegetables . In other 
cases, traditional organized criminal groups took delivery from non -tradi-
tional groups that specialized in smuggling tobacco into Canada . The tradi-
tional groups then transported and distributed the contraband tobacco to 
their communities. As a result of their experience in other criminal enter -
prises, including the drug trade, traditional organized crime groups knew 
the techniques and strategies required to maintain the clandestine nature of 
their networks. They instructed delivery drivers , for example, to pick up a 
vehicle at Location A and leave it at Location B . The drivers didn't know 
how the vehicle got to Location A or what happened to it after they drove 
their designated route and dropped it off .
   5.8 Key Smuggling Route 
    Groups based on native Indian reserves conducted much of the ciga-
rette smuggling across the border. This was especially true of those in the 
Akwesasne-St. Regis Reserve, which straddles the Canadian-American 
border between Cornwall, Ontario, and Massena, New York . This region 
became the number one conduit for smuggling cigarettes into Canada . Po-
lice estimate as many as seven of every 10 contraband cigarettes consumed 
in Canada entered through the Cornwall-Massena area . Geography made it 
a smuggler's paradise. Not only is the St . Lawrence especially narrow there 
but its channel is also sprinkled with myriad islands and channels . Passage 
across the river is relatively easy in winter and summer . The risk of detec-
tion is quite low. 
   First Nations people can purchase for personal use unlimited amounts 
of tax-free tobacco in the United States. But this tobacco is required to re-
main on the reserve. Bona fide American wholesalers legally imported huge 
quantities of tobacco from Canada and sold it to vendors on Akwesasne-St. 
Regis. They, in turn, either smuggled the products into Canada themselves 
or sold them to other smugglers. They used planes , boats, snowmobiles and 
tractor trailers to do so. Smuggling groups based at Akwesasne-St . Regis 
began to take advantage of other profitable opportunities and smuggled other 
goods into Canada including illegal drugs and arms. 
   Alcohol was also a popular commodity for smugglers . In the latter part 
of 1993, for example, Canadian police found that about 25 percent of ship-
ments of contraband tobacco also contained illegal alcohol . Since the sharp 
cut in tobacco taxes in February 1994, indications suggest many smuggling
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groups now focus heavily on bootleg alcohol. By the end of 1994, seven 
native liquor distributors on the Akwesasne-St. Regis reserve were taking 
delivery of five to seven truck loads a day. Distributors said there was no 
U.S. tax paid on the shipments because the liquor was for export. New York 
State tax investigators said that 97 percent of the alcohol shipped to the 
reserve was smuggled into Canada. 
   The morality of tobacco smuggling is hotly debated among native 
groups in Canada. Many native Canadians believe they have a legal and 
constitutional right to travel freely across the U.S.-Canada border and to 
transport "their own proper goods and effects" (according to rights granted 
under the 1794 Jay Treaty) without paying or having to collect tax or duty. 
They also feel a spiritual ownership of tobacco, which native Canadians 
and Americans introduced to the European settlers. Some oppose the con-
traband trade. They claim smuggling has corrupted natives into abandoning 
their traditions and brought. weapons, increased crime and violence into 
their communities. Others, though, passionately assert they have an historic 
right to trade in cigarettes - a legal product. "It puts food on my table," a 
Mohawk living on the New York side of the Akwesasne Reserve told a 
reporter. "Our grandchildren have to have a way to take care of themselves. 
Why is it that any time an Indian stands up to help himself he's an outlaw?" 
Only a minority of residents of Akwesasne-St. Regis participated in smug-
gling.
5.9 Individual Citizens Corrupted 
   Canadians tend to be law abiding. They're appalled by dealers selling 
illicit drugs or stolen property. Yet when it came to contraband tobacco, 
many showed a far different attitude, turning a blind eye to this illegal prod-
uct much in the way many people saw nothing wrong with bootleg liquor 
during Prohibition. Perhaps the most worrisome effect of the Canadian 
government's high-tax policy was its widespread corruptive influence. 
   All kinds of individual entrepreneurs got into the business: husbands 
and wives, illegal immigrants, pensioners, the unemployed, college and even 
high school students. With limited finances, cost to young people is par-
ticularly important. Consequently, the black market, which offered ciga-
rettes, on average, 20-50 percent cheaper than retail prices, was most at-
tractive. "Just as every school has a drug dealer," one high school student 
said in 1993, "now every school has a cigarette dealer." Buying from that 
dealer or others became a "cool thing" for students to do. Breaking the law
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was perceived as a positive act, a way of sending a protest message to the 
government. Without really knowing it, they learned tax evasion and how 
to deal in an illicit product. 
   There was no stigma to participating in the contraband market. Many 
smokers saw it as a victimless crime, and did not seem to care that it en-
riched the criminal element. Nor were they mindful that they evaded sig-
nificant taxes. Government officials also noticed the growth of a "me-too" 
attitude, a type of behavior identified in a number of social studies . Accord-
ing to these studies, people are more inclined to cheat the tax system if they 
believe their neighbors are doing so.
   5.10 Store Owners and Employees 
   Owners and employees of corner stores, donut shops, restaurants and 
other places that sold cigarettes were likewise drawn into the contraband 
network. Although some did not sell contraband cigarettes under the counter , 
others did. Faced with the prospect of customers shopping at competitors 
who stocked dual inventory, many store keepers - often reluctantly , as they 
reported to us - followed suit. As a result they didn't collect taxes and didn't 
report some revenue on their income tax. In other words, they broke the law 
when they didn't really want to.  Their survival in a struggling economy was 
threatened. They not only lost cigarette sales if they didn't sell contraband 
but other purchases, such as milk and bread. They felt they had no choice.
  5.11 Low Risk of Getting Caught 
   What also drove individuals and organized groups into the contraband 
trade was the low risk of getting caught. Although penalties for smuggling 
increased significantly, only a trickle of contraband tobacco was ever seized . 
One enforcement officer for the Ontario Provincial Police ("the OPP") said 
that in one month in 1993 it seized only 30,000 cartons along a busy smug-
gling route near Cornwall, Ontario. That monthly total was less than the 
50,000 cartons that law enforcement estimated went through undetected 
each day.
  5.12 The Challenge for Law Enforcement 
   Tackling the contraband tobacco trade, said one Canadian police of-
ficer, was akin to "a mouse trying to manage an elephant." Enforcement 
alone cannot control a major consensual crime, as shown by the huge re-
sources expended against the illegal drug trade. Although federal and pro-
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vincial governments tried desperately to increase the resources devoted to 
combating the tobacco trade, the size, sophistication and pervasiveness of 
the trade simply overwhelmed law enforcement agencies. The tide began to 
turn against the smugglers only when governments drastically reduced taxes. 
         6. Cigarette Smuggling in the United States 
   6.1 Introduction 
   Cigarette smuggling and tax evasion first became a serious problem in 
the United States in the 1960s due to state tax differentials and peaked in 
the mid-1970s before declining a decade later. At its height in the mid-
1970s, this illicit trade sparked growing concern among law enforcement. 
"Cigarette smuggling is probably the most lucrative crime in America to -
day," said Herman Lisnow, Deputy Controller of Texas, in the December 
15, 1977 issue of Forbes magazine. This. criminal sector grossed as much 
as $1.5 billion in 1976 alone, according to Forbes. 
   What primarily sparked the growth of cigarette smuggling in the United 
States in the 1960s was the emergence - and subsequent widening - of the 
differential between state tobacco taxes. In 1960, this differential was quite 
narrow, ranging from a low of zero tax in Virginia, North Carolina, Colo-
rado and Oregon to a high of eight cents in Texas. A decade later, the pic-
ture had changed dramatically as states raised tobacco taxes. At the high 
end was Pennsylvania with an 18-cent-a-pack rate; at the low, North Caro-
lina with a two-cent-a-pack levy. Twenty-eight states levied taxes of 10 
cents or more a pack. By 1975, North Carolina remained the lowest tax 
state with a two-cent-a-pack levy. At the other extreme was Connecticut 
with a 21-cent-a-pack tax. Fourteen states levied taxes of 15 cents or more; 
39 states levied taxed of 10 cents or more. The federal tobacco tax stood at 
eight cents a pack from 1951 to 1982 until it doubled to 16 cents on January 
1, 1983. As a 1985 report issued by the Washington-based Advisory Com-
mission on Intergovernmental Relations ("the ACIR") stated: 
   "The large state tax differentials created inviting opportunities for in-
dependent `entrepreneurs' and organized crime groups. The large profit 
potential combined with the ease of handling cigarettes, the limited resources 
allocated by the states to law enforcement, the light penalties imposed by 
the courts and the lack of federal laws against cigarette smuggling, resulted 
in an epidemic of organized cigarette smuggling and illegal diversion of 
cigarettes from the legal distribution system by the 1970s."
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   6.2 Smuggling and the Mexican Border 
    Organized crime also took advantage of cross-border opportunities 
involving ostensibly duty-free exports of cigarettes - via bonded warehouses 
- to Mexico . 
   According to a 1977 article in the New York Times: 
    "The warehouses sell 
cigarettes tax-free for importation into Mexico . 
   But Rex Davis [the then director of the Bureau of Alcohol , Tobacco 
   and  Firearms] said most of the tax-free cigarettes never made it to 
   Mexico. They are sold in the United States through a black market that 
   thrives in border cities." 
   Added the 1985 report on cigarette tax evasion by the ACIR: 
   "In some Mexican b
order communities, the smuggling of cigarettes , 
   [alcohol) and luxury items purchased from duty-free stores and 
   smuggled back into the United States is a constant source of friction 
   between customs and retail merchants ." 
   In Texas, indicated Mr. Lisnow , cigarettes supposedly exported to 
Mexico were, in fact, diverted to the black market . As he told the Houston 
Post in 1976: 
   "We have a
n export-import problem. You don't pay state or federal 
   taxes on cigarettes shipped into Mexico . So people buy legally in the 
   United States, ship them over the border where they turn around mid-
   river and come back into the country ." 
   To address this situation, regulations governing duty-free export ware -
   houses on the Mexican border were tightened in 1977 .
  6.3 Why Smuggling Declined in the Early 1980s 
   The decline of smuggling in the early 1980s was due to several fac -
tors. The passing of the Federal Cigarette Contraband Act of 1978 enabled 
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms to have a considerable suc-
cess in stopping over the road smuggling and reducing the illegal diversion 
of cigarettes. Increased law enforcement played a major part in reducing . 
smuggling to such an extent that, in 1984, Robert J. Kleine, a Senior Ana-
lyst with the ACIR, concluded: "Cigarette smuggling is under control ." 
   But a much stronger factor may have been a reduction in the profit 
incentive for cigarette smugglers . This was the conclusion of a 1982 study 
entitled "Cigarette Tax Evasion and Interstate Smuggling: An Assessment 
of Recent Activity" by Kenneth E. Warner. It noted that a number of states 
sharply raised tobacco taxes in the 1960s and early 1970s . But there was a
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marked absence of such hikes between 1973 and 1981, a period of high 
inflation and rapidly escalating energy costs. Increases in the cost of living 
trimmed the real value of the smugglers' profit margin - i.e. the amount of 
tax paid by the consumer. Moreover, the oil price shocks boosted the cost 
of transporting contraband cigarettes. These two developments had the ef-
fect of substantially eroding the profit margins of cigarette smuggling.
  6.4 Extent of the Problem Today in the United States 
   The duty-free outlet on the West Coast of the U.S. did a booming busi-
ness selling tax-not-paid cigarettes to either outbound freighters docked at 
local ports or ship chandlers. But it was also engaged in an equally lucrative 
sideline in which it knowingly evaded both federal and state tobacco taxes. 
   According to law enforcement, although shipments of U.S.-brand ciga-
rettes were, in some cases, actually loaded on freighters in port, they were 
subsequently unloaded and sold untaxed at huge profits. Similarly, crooked 
chandlers funneled their untaxed cigarette purchases, intended for outbound 
ships; to the domestic black market. Over the past two years, it's estimated 
that this scam resulted in thousands of cases of cigarettes leaking into the 
hands of smugglers. These kinds of schemes are difficult to detect because 
the paperwork associated with them appears genuine, making it seem as if 
the cigarettes were actually exported. Detection is further complicated be-
cause the illicit cigarettes often change. hands five or six times before reach-
ing their final destination. 
   Sophisticated schemes like this one, which evade both federal and state 
taxes, are a growing feature of cigarette smuggling in the 19905. There 
appears to be a criminal effort to supply smugglers with cigarettes diverted 
from duty-free operators on both the Canadian and Mexican borders. In 
some port cities, ship chandlers supply untaxed cigarettes to smugglers. 
There have been convictions of ship chandlers in Texas and Washington 
State and investigations are under way in the New York-New Jersey area.
   6.5 Organized Crime 
   When New York City investigators raided a significant distributor of 
illegal cigarettes in the city's Brooklyn area in 1994, they heard an unusual 
justification. The distributor claimed to have an arrangement to supply a 
local company with cigarettes in return for the perpetual care of some grave 
sites in Russia. The arrangement proved as fictitious as the company that 
was supposed to get the cigarettes. What was especially noteworthy about
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this black market operation was the apparent involvement of a new key 
player in organized crime - the Russian mob. This is not an isolated incident 
linking Russian organized crime - already an influential player in the illicit 
gasoline trade - to the black market in cigarettes on both the east and west 
coasts. Stated a well-placed federal law enforcement official: "They've come 
on the scene fairly strongly recently." The Russians are not alone . The fed-
eral official added: "We've found almost the entire scope of organized crime 
involved." 
   In many cases, criminal groups that are in the illegal cigarette business 
also handle other illegal commodities, including drugs and alcohol . One 
group on the East Coast, for example, is believed to traffic in both heroin 
and cigarettes. Casual alliances are also made between criminal groups to 
facilitate the distribution of illicit cigarettes . The federal expert compared it 
to the kind of arrangement that might be struck between two legitimate 
companies, one of which has excess inventory of a product needed by the 
other. He stated: "They can cut an appropriate deal even with a competitor 
if it's mutually beneficial." 
   There are organized schemes in some states to avoid the payment of 
both federal and state taxes through phony export schemes , according to 
law enforcement sources. In such schemes , individuals and companies buy 
cigarettes for shipment abroad and - while the  paperwork shows the ciga-
rettes leaving the U.S - they never do. Rather, the cigarettes are diverted 
into the contraband market. Investigators interviewed in the states of New 
York, Washington, Texas, New Jersey as well as federal agents say this 
type of scheme is difficult to detect. They believe it will flourish if the 
federal cigarette excise tax is raised significantly .
   A. California 
   The smuggling, distribution and sale of untaxed cigarettes has become 
a significant crime problem for California law enforcement agencies and all 
citizens of California. In parts of Los Angeles, untaxed cigarettes are avail-
able from a variety of outlets, including mom-and-pop corner stores, bars , 
donut shops, canteen trucks, out of the back of cars and street vendors . As 
Monte Williams, Administrator of the Excise Taxes Division of the Cali-
fornia Board of Equalization, stated in April 1994: 
   "We believe California is 
suffering a significant revenue loss due to 
   the purposeful evasion of the cigarette tax. We believe the largest is-
   sue facing California is cross-border evasion of the "Export Only" ciga-
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   rettes. This problem opens up markets for illegal cigarettes to all  per-
    sons that smoke." 
   Law enforcement authorities say that profits from cigarette smuggling 
have attracted armed and dangerous Russian/Armenian and Hispanic crimi-
nal groups. They quickly established sophisticated smuggling and distribu-
tion systems in the state, largely in the greater Los Angeles area. There 
were two homicides in the last five months of 1994 involving contraband 
cigarettes. In both cases Russians are suspects. "One street vendor who had 
ripped off his supplier was found with a slug in his head," says one investi-
gator. "It was an execution." 
   These criminal gangs supply street vendors or runners (who are the 
lowest level of the distribution chain) using many of the same methods 
found in the narcotics business. The street vendors also sell to a variety of 
outlets including small mom-and-pop stores, liquor stores, catering trucks, 
bars, and independent grocery stores. In 1994, the Ventura, California Sher-
iffs Department discovered that a gang of young Russian criminals com-
mitted a rash of cigarette thefts from liquor stores. They broke in through 
roofs of liquor stores and took nothing but cartons of cigarettes - as many as 
500 cartons at a time. Later, cigarettes similar to those stolen in the liquor 
store robberies turned up in the possession of Los Angeles street vendors. 
Many of the vendors also sold cigarettes labeled for export that were ille-
gally obtained from the same criminal gang. Criminal groups which supply 
California smuggle untaxed cigarettes from Mexico and Indian reserves in 
neighboring states. 
   B. Michigan 
   Michigan levies the second highest state tobacco tax in the country at 
75 cents a pack. Importantly for smugglers, it does not require cigarettes 
sold in the state to carry a tax-paid stamp - only an inked stamp on each 
one-half case of cigarettes. The consumption of smuggled cigarettes has 
grown dramatically in Michigan, in direct response to the 200-percent rise 
in the state tobacco tax in May 1994. 
    Smuggling networks supply the burgeoning underground markets of 
Michigan. Through them, organized smuggling groups, dual-inventory dis-
tributors, dual-inventory suppliers and others connect to distribute their il-
legal products. They face a low risk of detection and far more lenient penal-
ties than for other illegal activities. Organized smuggling groups dominate 
the transportation of untaxed cigarettes into Michigan, as well as their dis-
tribution to dual-inventory distributors. Between six and 10 organized smug-
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gling groups supply the illicit cigarette market in Metropolitan Detroit alone . 
Organized smuggling groups are both illegally importing cigarettes from 
low-tax states and tapping into the pool of suppliers on Indian reservations 
in upper New York state , many of which supplied the Canadian contraband 
market in the late 1980s and early 1990s . 
    A major out-of-state tobacco supplier that illegally distributed ciga -
rettes to criminal groups during Canada's recent smuggling crisis now sup -
plies illicit cigarettes in Michigan. It is closely linked to a transport com-
pany whose principals are connected to a major traditional organized crime 
group in Buffalo. In a highly organized operation, armed robbers in 1995 
hijacked a large shipment of cigarettes in the southern United States . A 
significant portion of the shipment later appeared in an illicit cigarette ware -
house in Michigan. 
   C. Texas 
   Texas investigators are aware of a large organized scheme to divert 
for-export-only cigarettes to the contraband market . The cigarettes are be-
lieved to be either sold in Texas or transported to other western states through 
New Mexico. In one major case involving a sophisticated ring , authorities 
seized 75,000 cartons of untaxed cigarettes when they raided the group's 
warehouse in 1993. Smuggling in Texas is committed by either individuals 
or small, close-knit, family-based groups . Typically in such cases, they ob-
tain  ̀ cigarettes legally from a duty-free shop and transport them into Mexico . 
The purchaser then either sells the cigarettes to a smuggling organization or 
smuggles them himself. The large volume of traffic at ports of entry makes 
it difficult to detect such shipments . Only a small percentage of vehicles are 
inspected and the emphasis is on detecting narcotics , not illicit tobacco.
              7. Understanding the Dynamics 
               of the Illicit Cigarette Trade: 
                An Investigative Framework
   7.1 A Consensual Crime 
   It is difficult for law enforcement to investigate consensual crimes , 
such as drug offenses, prostitution and illegal gambling . Goods and ser-
vices are exchanged between willing buyers and vendors . Although some 
participants may, in fact, be victims, they are unlikely to file a complaint 
with the police. That may be the last thing on their minds . Of the many 
consensual crimes, contraband tobacco presents a unique challenge . The
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product is legal. Possession of a package of cigarettes is not illegal - as 
possession of cocaine or heroin would be.
  7.2 Why Do Consumers Buy Illegal Cigarettes? 
   Our research has found a correlation between a contraband problem 
and a general feeling among local residents that their taxes are too high - 
and that the tax burden, in general, is not fairly shared. This feeling tends to 
translate itself into a greater willingness to participate in underground eco-
nomic activity, including purchasing illegal cigarettes. Moreover, when-
ever money is tight, otherwise honest people are under greater temptation 
to make ends meet by purchasing untaxed goods and services. Social stud-
ies indicate that people are more prone to cheat if they believe their neigh-
bors are cheating too. Once individuals cheat on one type of activity, they 
may find it easier to cheat on other things as well. They get into the habit of 
cheating leading to a general corrupting of the social fabric. Many people 
who participate in the underground economy don't believe they're doing 
anything wrong. With respect to illegal cigarettes, they either fail to com-
prehend that they're putting money into the pockets of organized criminals, 
or don't care.
  7.3 Why Do Vendors Sell Illegal Cigarettes? 
   Evading tobacco taxes increases the profit-making opportunities of 
retailers and wholesalers. Using the United States as an example, say a car-
ton of cigarettes legally retails for $20, including $7.50 in federal, state and 
local tobacco taxes. And let's say the retailer evades the $7.50 in taxes and 
sells the untaxed cigarettes for $15 a carton. He will therefore increase his 
profit margin by $2.50 a carton. Moreover, he may also decide not to de-
clare the $2.50 a carton he's earning from illegal cigarettes on his income 
tax. 
   In Canada, which experienced an alarming contraband tobacco crisis 
in the early 1990s, some vendors were extorted to participate in this illegal 
sector. Criminal gangs operating in certain ethnic communities forced re-
tailers to either: 
• Begin selling contraband cigarettes that the gang provided; or 
• If they were already selling such goods, to switch suppliers and buy their 
stock from the gang. 
    Then there is the factor of economic necessity. When Lindquist Avey 
began its cigarette smuggling investigations in Canada in the early 1990's,
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a number of owners of mom-and-pop corner stores were interviewed who 
vowed never to sell contraband tobacco products . By late 1993 and early 
1994, so many corner stores in parts of the City of Toronto were selling 
illicit cigarettes that other retailers either had to join in or face bankruptcy . 
This was a particularly difficult decision for retailers who prided themselves 
on their  personal honesty. 
    Once underground economic activity takes root , it can drive otherwise 
legitimate wholesalers or retailers either out of business - or (unwillingly) 
into the underground sector . As happened with individuals , breaking the 
law becomes "habit forming" . A corner store owner who evades federal 
and state tobacco taxes may go further and also evade the income tax on 
those sales. He may also decide to evade taxes on other products . In addi-
tion, a vendor who sells one type of illegal product may begin to sell others . 
We have found that some purveyors of smuggled cigarettes , for example, 
also began to sell bootleg liquor . 
                    8. Case Initiation 
   8.1 Initial Awareness 
   The first hint of cigarette smuggling may come from police officers
, 
state or federal tax authorities or an organized crime intelligence unit . It is 
equally likely to come from an informant , legitimate cigarette wholesaler 
or from store owners who notice a sudden shift in the cigarette buying pat -
terns of regular customers. An investigator with responsibility for cigarette 
smuggling should immediately verify the information and , if possible, find 
another source to confirm it .
   8.2 Case Planning 
   The penetration of the cigarette market by sophisticated smugglers has 
caught some investigative agencies off guard . The sudden loss of millions 
in tax revenue has put pressure on investigators to respond quickly . That 
response should be determined by the nature of the target and the type of 
offense being committed. The response will clearly differ if the suspect is 
just a small neighborhood distributor or a large cross-border, or inter-state , 
smuggling ring. 
   In case planning, it is worth noting that in many jurisdictions narcot -
ics, alcohol bootlegging and illegal gun trafficking offenders , and cigarette 
smugglers often use similar methods. Indeed , the same organization may - 
depending on the circumstances and profit potential - handle a number of
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illicit products. Not surprisingly, their organizational structures are also fre-
quently quite similar. In many instances, they exhibit the characteristics of 
what has been called "the informal organization." This is defined by the 
Police Executive Research Forum as "a structure that naturally arises among 
people carrying on a continuous activity that requires numerous partici-
pants. This structure serves the participants well, eliminating the need for a 
more formal organization."
8.3 Asset Forfeiture 
   A contraband cigarette investigation may also provide attractive asset 
forfeiture opportunities for law enforcement. Criminal organizations in-
volved in the illicit cigarette trade face many of the same problems as nar-
cotics traffickers. That is, they typically have to disguise the origins of their 
ill-gotten gains so they can be used without raising the suspicion of law 
enforcement and/or tax authorities. 
   At the street level, for example, cigarette sales generate a large amount 
of cash, which needs to be laundered. This may necessitate the use of smurfs 
— who inject dirty cash into the banking system through a series of innocu-
ous-seeking small transactions — and other techniques intended to avoid 
money laundering statutes. Thus, many of the same approaches that have 
been successfully employed in drug money laundering investigations and 
prosecutions can also be used in cigarette smuggling cases.
   8.4 Information Sources 
   If cigarette smuggling is a new offense in a particular jurisdiction, it 
does not necessarily mean a shortage of potential leads and background 
documentation from existing files. Experienced investigators suggest look-
ing at: 
• prior case reports on cigarette smuggling which may suggest patterns or 
possible suspects; 
• reports filed by officers on the scene of a reported offense; 
• arrest records that contain details of previous offenses, home addresses of 
alleged perpetrators and former employers; 
• fingerprint files for an identification check; 
• firearms registration records containing the owner's name, address and 
type of gun; 
• traffic violation records which contain the names of individuals and most 
importantly the type of vehicle used by the possible suspect;
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• traffic accident reports which may contain names of witn
esses which could 
be friends or acquaintances of the suspect; 
• motor vehicle records which can give address
, license plate and car make 
and model information; 
• personal property records containing informati
on on loans for cars, boats 
or airplanes; 
• probation and parole records which can give current 
and former employ-
ment history, residence and comments of parole staff; and 
• marriage records for current and former spou
ses.
   8.5 Private Information Resources 
   Holders of private records may be persuaded to volunteer background 
information to help investigators . The most likely are companies doing credit 
checks, telephone companies , insurance firms or banks.
   8.6 Using Conspiracy Law 
    Deciding how best to use the law in a specific case is an important part 
of case initiation. Traditionally, investigations into illegal cigarette activi -
ties have made little use of criminal conspiracy statutes , which have been 
effective against narcotics traffickers . A criminal conspiracy is a group of 
people coming together for illegal purposes. An agreement to commit crimi-
nal acts establishes the crime of conspiracy . No crime has to be enacted for 
a conspiracy to exist. Usually the initial criminal venture begins with two or 
three people and as others are brought into it , they too become members of 
the conspiracy. As in drug trafficking , the brains and money behind ciga-
rette smuggling usually are well insulated from those driving contraband 
across borders or from street runners who distribute to party stores or res -
taurants. Conspiracy investigations can help to penetrate the top echelons 
of contraband networks. 
                9. Intelligence Operations 
   9.1 Outline 
   Collecting precise knowledge of illegal cigarette operations is crucial 
for any law enforcement or tax administrative agency intent on developing 
a successful long term investigative strategy . Intelligence can give agencies 
a dear understanding of specific criminal activities . It can provide: 
• the source of contraband supplies; 
• the quantity , price and storage location of illicit tobacco products;
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• the identity of people heading and financing the criminal enterprise; 
• the transportation routes used in the various stages of distribution; and 
• the identity of street distributors.
  9.2 Tactical Intelligence 
   Tactical intelligence involves information whose aim is to assist a spe-
cific ongoing investigation. It can rapidly result in arrests.
  9.3 Operational Intelligence 
   Operational intelligence involves information which can be gathered 
to support an investigation into a continuing criminal enterprise.
  9.4 Strategic Intelligence 
   Strategic intelligence involves developing an overview of specific ac-
tivity or trends in tobacco smuggling in one jurisdiction or region. It is usu-
ally the fruit of long term intelligence gathering and the pooling of intelli-
gence gathered by a number of agencies. It is used to shape future intelli-
gence efforts and to determine the focus of future investigations.
  9.5 Building an Intelligence Unit 
   Experienced cigarette smuggling investigators emphasize the impor-
tance of having an intelligence unit. Existing organized crime and drug in-
telligence units can be utilized for this purpose, especially given the in-
creasing overlap between the trafficking of drugs, alcohol, guns, stolen cars 
and contraband tobacco products.
  9.6 Collecting Intelligence 
   The gathering of tips, complaints and reports from excise tax officials 
and street patrol officers forms what is known as overt information. It yields 
data on the activities of known smugglers, the identities of those with whom 
they associate, cars or vans they drive and indications of the locations where 
they operate. Covert methods can be used to gather detailed information on 
specific targets. This can include physical and electronic surveillance, as 
well as the use of informants and undercover agents.
  9.7 Processing Intelligence Data 
   Raw intelligence data should be collated so that it can be analysed and 
accessed whenever necessary. New information should be immediately cata-
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logued and quickly made available to other intelligence officers and those 
in command of ongoing investigations .
9.8 Analysing Intelligence 
   In analysing intelligence data , valuable information should be sepa-
rated from irrelevant or inaccurate raw data and converted to useful intelli -
gence. It can help agents determine what information they are lacking and 
shape future covert intelligence gathering .
   9.9 Distributing Intelligence 
   Formal written intelligence reports should be prepared for regular dis -
tribution to task force commanders and field investigators containing known 
factual information and analysis by intelligence specialists . The reports are 
sensitive and distribution should be limited to those involved in the investi -
gation.
                 10. Controlled Delivery 
    A controlled delivery is a widely used drug enforcement technique . It 
permits investigators to monitor the nature and extent of activities of a drug 
trafficking group by tracking a cargo of narcotics as it moves through a 
transportation network. If drugs are discovered in a truck carrying fruit , for 
example, rather than seizing the drugs , investigators will allow it to con-
tinue to its destination. The cargo will be kept under surveillance so inves -
tigators can see who picks it up and where the drugs are delivered for distri -
bution. A controlled delivery of illegal cigarettes can yield similar benefits 
to a tobacco investigator. Cigarettes are a bulkier commodity than cocaine 
or heroin. Thus, it is more difficult to conceal large quantities of illegal 
cigarettes for shipment, especially across international borders . In the United 
States, for example, transport trucks are frequently used to bring loads of 
smuggled cigarettes across both the Mexican and Canadian borders . Often 
up to a dozen cases of cigarettes (50 cartons to a case) can be hidden behind 
loads of produce or behind other bulk goods shipped by truck . With auto-
matic pre-clearance of transport trucks at customs becoming more common 
at both borders, there is less and less physical inspection of trucks and more 
opportunity for cigarette smuggling .
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11. Undercover Operations
  11.1 Outline 
   This chapter seeks to provide some context for conducting such opera-
tions in respect to an illegal cigarette investigation.
   11.2 A Consensual Crime 
   Because of the consensual nature of the illicit cigarette trade, ordinary 
police methods will, in many instances, have limited results. Buyers and 
sellers of illegal cigarettes are unlikely to complain with law enforcement. 
In fact, their main intention will be to avoid any contact with law enforce-
ment. In some cases, therefore, undercover operations may be the most ap-
propriate strategy in investigating an illegal cigarette operation.
   11.3 An Undercover Response 
   In an undercover operation, evidence is gathered by gaining the confi-
dence of a suspected violator through the use of disguises and pretexts. 
That can lead to the identification of co- conspirators, other criminal or 
civil violations, and help determine future investigative goals and activi-
ties.
   11.4 Purpose of the Operation 
   In general, an undercover operation seeks to establish whether a Un-
dercover crime is being planned or committed, identify co-conspirators, 
obtain evidence, and collect intelligence.
  11.5 Follow Appropriate Guidelines 
   As in any undercover operation, it is critical that undercover cigarette 
smuggling investigations follow the undercover operational guidelines and 
practices of the agency(ies)/police department(s) that support it. Such guide-
lines and practices should cover a number of topics, including, but not lim-
ited to, the following: 
• Safety factors and requirements; 
• Legal considerations and requirements; 
• Possible pitfalls and precautions; 
• The selection and training of the undercover agent and/or operative; 
• The selection and training of the cover team; 
• Surveillance techniques and protocols; and
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• Pre-activity preparations
, including developing a cover story and an un-
dercover identity, obtaining an appropriate location for the undercover  agent/ 
operative.
                      12. Conclusion 
    Empirical evidence from around the world shows that high tobacco 
taxes create a consumer demand for a cheaper product . Where this occurs, 
organized criminals invariably establish networks to smuggle , distribute and 
retail untaxed cigarettes. 
   Cigarette smuggling damages society in numerous ways: 
• Illegal cigarettes allow organized crime to undermine the legal di
stribu-
tion and retailing networks by competing unfairly in the market place . This 
penalizes honest retailers and wholesalers who dutifully remit taxes . 
• Government revenues are reduced . This means government programs and 
services are either cut, reduced or taxes are raised . 
• Underground economic activity is that it brings otherwi
se law-abiding 
citizens into contact with criminal activity . 
   It is crucial for Governments to avoid instituting policies which create 
a black market in any product - for black markets inevitably promote the 
development of organized crime groups . Once established, they are diffi-
cult to eliminate. Even if the policies which initially spawned a particular 
black market are repealed, criminal groups will simply shift to another il -
licit sector.
